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THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT & GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS: COMPLIANCE
TRENDS & COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES
By Jessica Tillipman

T

he U.S. Government spent nearly $538 billion dollars in Fiscal Year 2010 for goods and services
provided by private contractors.1 This astronomical number is the result of the U.S. Government’s
ever-increasing reliance on private companies to keep the Government running. Private companies
that contract with the U.S. Government are subject to an extensive set of rules and requirements
designed to ensure they behave responsibly and to provide taxpayers and the U.S. Government with
the best value for their money.2 Experienced Government contractors maintain sophisticated compliance programs to ensure they do not run afoul
of the stringent U.S. procurement requirements.
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In the past decade, however, as U.S. Government contractors continue to expand their global
presence, even the most experienced contractors
have exposed themselves to new risks and compliance requirements. In particular, as contractors
expand their business with government entities
outside the United States, the long arm of the U.S.
Government continues to govern their transactions. Specifically, the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act prohibits, among other things, the bribery
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of foreign officials to obtain or retain business
with a foreign entity.3
The United States is currently the world leader
in foreign antibribery enforcement.4 This is due
to a sharp rise in FCPA enforcement activity in
the past decade.5 The number of FCPA enforcement actions continues to increase each year,
breaking records not only in the number of corporate prosecutions, but also in total penalties
imposed. In 2010 alone, total penalties resulting
from FCPA enforcement actions topped $1.7
billion.6 In addition, with over 150 criminal and
80 civil FCPA investigations in the pipeline in
2010, enforcement does not show signs of slowing anytime soon.7 Indeed, the Department of
Justice has made clear that FCPA enforcement is
a priority, noting that it “remains committed to
prosecuting violations of the FCPA to ensure that
the payment of bribes can no longer be viewed
simply as the cost of doing business in a foreign
nation.”8
While FCPA compliance is imperative for all
companies subject to its jurisdiction, it is particularly important for companies that contract with
the Government. Given the nature of a Government contractor’s business, they are naturally
at greater risk of violating the FCPA than those
companies that do not interact with Government
officials on a regular basis. In fact, in the years
preceding the enactment of the FCPA, the U.S.
Congress singled out Government contractors and
their overseas behavior as particularly troubling.
In the 1970s, a bribery scandal involving Lockheed
Corporation (now Lockheed Martin Corporation),
Northrop Corporation, and oil companies (Gulf
Oil Corporation, Phillips Petroleum Company,
and Ashland Oil, Inc.) was the likely impetus for
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legislation prohibiting overseas corruption.9 The
Government discovered, among other instances
of bribery, that Lockheed had paid millions of
dollars in bribes to foreign governments to secure
contracts, embarrassing both the United States
and the relevant foreign governments.10 Moreover,
although the company admitted to paying $22
million “under the table to foreign government
officials and political organizations,” the company
refused to identify the recipients of the bribes,
explaining that “identifying its beneficiaries could
hurt its $1.6 billion backlog of unfilled foreign
orders.”11 The company also refused to promise
to stop bribing foreign officials, stating that the
payments were a necessary cost of doing business
and “consistent with practices engaged in by
numerous other companies abroad.”12 Government investigations and congressional hearings
during this time uncovered a landscape in which
bribery was pervasive and an accepted practice
of the Government’s largest contractors. 13 Thus,
in enacting the FCPA, the Government sought
to deter and prevent Government contractors
and other companies from engaging in corrupt
practices overseas.
Three decades later, the legislation designed
to prevent and punish the bribery of foreign
government officials has become a thorn in the
side of companies that seek to do business with
the U.S. Government. Six of the 10 most prolific
contractors with the U.S. Government, including Lockheed Martin Corporation, The Boeing
Company, General Dynamics Corporation, Raytheon Company, L-3 Communications, and BAE
Systems, either violated the FCPA or engaged
in activities that allegedly implicate the FCPA’s
antibribery provisions. Moreover, U.S. Government contractors that have been investigated by
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the Government for violating the FCPA generally
have not settled cheaply. In fact, the top 10 most
expensive settlements in FCPA history include
eight large U.S. Government contractors: Siemens
AG, Halliburton/KBR, BAE Systems, JGC Corporation, Daimler AG, Alcatel-Lucent, Panalpina,
and Johnson & Johnson.14
For contractors that do business with the Federal Government, these record-shattering FCPA
fines are levied in the shadow of the U.S. Government’s purchasing power. For example, the
companies that settled the three most expensive
FCPA enforcement actions to date, and together
paid approximately $1.8 billion in fines (Siemens
AG, $800 million; Halliburton/KBR, $579 million;
BAE Systems, $400 million),15 also obtained over
$10 billion dollars in U.S. Government contracts
in FY 2010.16 These figures demonstrate that the
FCPA creates a substantial risk for U.S. Government contractors that want to maintain or grow
their business with certain foreign governments.
If a U.S. Government contractor runs afoul of
the FCPA, it could be subject to a multitude
of penalties beyond those faced by companies
that do not contract with the U.S. Government,
as discussed below. Indeed, U.S. Government
contractors that violate the FCPA face not only
sky-high fines and other monetary penalties, but
also risk being blacklisted and prevented from
bidding on future contracting opportunities offered by its Government customers.17

FCPA Basics & Recent Developments In The
Law
The FCPA contains two distinct components:
(1) the antibribery prohibitions18 and (2) the
recordkeeping and internal control provisions.19
The DOJ is responsible for all criminal enforcement of the antibribery provisions and all civil
enforcement of the antibribery provisions involving
domestic concerns and foreign companies and
nationals.20 The DOJ is also responsible for the
criminal enforcement of “willful” violations of the
books-and-records provisions.21 The U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission is responsible for civil
enforcement of the books-and-records provisions,
as well as for civil enforcement of the antibribery
provisions as applied to “issuers”—any U.S. or
Briefing Papers © 2011 by Thomson Reuters
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foreign company, or an officer, employee, agent,
or stockholder thereof, that either issues securities (or American Depositary Receipts) or must
file reports with the SEC.22 The Federal Bureau
of Investigation now plays a prominent role in
FCPA matters, including through its specialized
“International Corruption Unit” dedicated to the
investigation of overseas corruption.23 Indeed, all
three agencies have specialized units dedicated
to the enforcement of the FCPA.24
■■

Antibribery Prohibitions

The antibribery provisions prohibit the offer
or payment of money or anything of value to a
foreign official for the purpose of obtaining or
retaining business.25 The phrase “anything of
value” has always been construed broadly by the
Government and is not limited to money.26 Generally, whether an item constitutes “anything of
value” depends on the subjective value attached
by the particular recipient.27 Moreover, there is
no minimum value that must be met before the
item constitutes an improper gift. Recent enforcement actions indicate that even de minimis
payments are prohibited under the antibribery
provisions. For example, the Criminal Information charging Panalpina Inc. with conspiring to
violate and violating the antibribery provisions
of the FCPA noted that “[t]he value of the bribe
payments ranged from de minimis amounts to
$25,000 per transaction,”28 and in the settlement
of Paradigm B.V.’s FCPA enforcement action, the
Government noted that the bribes included payments or “acceptance” fees of $100–200 dollars.29
The antibribery provisions prohibit the bribery of foreign government officials—they do not
prohibit bribery of purely commercial entities.
The FCPA expressly defines the term “foreign
official” as officers or employees of a foreign
government, including its departments, agencies and instrumentalities, public international
organizations, or persons acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of these entities.30 Similar
to other aspects of the FCPA, the Government
has interpreted the term “foreign official” very
broadly, including low-level employees of stateowned entities. Although the FCPA’s definition
of foreign official does not expressly mention
state-owned enterprises, the Government has
3
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argued that state-owned enterprises are merely
an “instrumentality” of a foreign government, as
expressly provided for in the FCPA.31 In several
recent cases, federal judges have affirmed the
Government’s interpretation of “foreign official,”
including a case in May 2011, where a judge
ruled that a state-owned entity may qualify as
an “instrumentality” of a foreign government.32
The defendants in that matter, former executives
from Control Components Inc., argued that a
state-owned entity could never be considered an
instrumentality of a foreign government.33 The
judge rejected this argument, explaining that
the determination regarding whether a company
is an instrumentality is a question of fact that
depends upon various factors, including (a) the
foreign state’s characterization of the entity and
its employees, (b) the foreign state’s degree of
control over the entity, (c) the purpose of the
entity’s activities, (d) the entity’s obligations and
privileges under the foreign state’s law, including whether the entity exercises exclusive or
controlling power to administer its designated
functions, (e) the circumstances surrounding
the entity’s creation, and (f) the foreign state’s
extent of ownership of the entity, including the
level of financial support by the state (e.g., subsidies, special tax treatment, and loans).34 The
court stated that the factors are “not exclusive,
and no single factor is dispositive,” explaining
that they are merely “relevant when determining
whether a state-owned company constitutes an
‘instrumentality’ under the FCPA.”35 Other recent
cases have also supported the Government’s interpretation,36 indicating that the Government’s
broad definition of the term “foreign official”
should be a benchmark for companies designing
FCPA compliance policies.
The FCPA provides one limited exception to
the antibribery prohibitions, as well as two affirmative defenses. All three are difficult to navigate
and rarely provide an adequate safeguard for a
company once improper payments have been
detected. The facilitating payment exception
states that the antibribery prohibitions do not
apply “to any facilitating payment or expediting
payment to a foreign official, political party, or
party official the purpose of which is to expedite
or to secure the performance of a routine governmental action.”37 This extremely limited exception
4
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is designed to permit payments used to expedite
“non-discretionary, ministerial activities performed
by mid- or low-level foreign functionaries.”38 The
exception is so limited, it has even been called
“illusory.”39 For example, in the DOJ’s settlement
with Noble Corporation for payments it made to
Nigerian customs officials in “special handling
charge[s],” the Government stated that the payments “were not qualifying facilitating payments
under the FCPA or otherwise legitimate expenses.”40
Consequently, because the company improperly
recorded the fees as “facilitation payments” in its
books and records, the Government also alleged
that Noble Corporation created false books and
records in violation of the FCPA. The U.S. Government’s limited interpretation of the facilitating payment exception brings it in line with the
majority of other governments, including the
United Kingdom, that do not permit facilitating
payments under their antibribery regimes.41 As
the Noble matter demonstrates, the facilitation
payment exception has caused confusion among
companies that do business with foreign governments, especially given the “continued high level
of demand for facilitation payments by foreign
officials, especially customs officers and for the
implementation of operating and maintenance
contracts.”42 Despite this increasing demand,
facilitation payments continue to create a dilemma for companies, given that (1) facilitation
payments are likely prohibited in the country in
which they are being sought, (2) there is little
available guidance regarding when the exception
is applicable, and (3) even if a payment were
to qualify as a facilitation payment, a company
would still need to record it properly in its books
and records. Indeed, failure to accurately record
potentially qualifying facilitation payments has
caused numerous companies to run afoul of the
FCPA’s books-and-records provisions.43
The two affirmative defenses to the antibribery
prohibitions are similarly limited in scope. Both
provisions provide a defense to liability under
the antibribery prohibitions for payments or gifts
to foreign officials if they are (1) lawful under
the written laws and regulations of the foreign
official’s country, or (2) “reasonable and bona
fide” expenditures incurred by or on behalf of a
foreign official “directly related” to the promotion, demonstration, or explanation of products
Briefing Papers © 2011 by Thomson Reuters
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or services or to the execution or performance of
a contract with a foreign government or agency.44
The first affirmative defense permits payments
only if they are expressly authorized under the
written laws or regulations of the foreign country.
This defense has long been considered relatively
obsolete, but was further narrowed in a recent
court ruling that clarified that this affirmative
defense applies only to laws that render the bribe
itself legal, regardless of whether the law provides
a form of legal amnesty to the defendant under
certain circumstances.45
The second affirmative defense permits U.S.
companies to pay “reasonable and bona fide”
expenses associated with a foreign official’s visit
to the United States, as long as they are directly
related to the promotion or demonstration of a
product or to the performance of a Government
contract.46 The DOJ’s FCPA Opinion Procedure,
under which the agency responds to specific
inquiries submitted by companies concerning
the legality of their conduct under the FCPA,47
continues to provide instructive guidance regarding this affirmative defense.48 Among many other
Opinion Procedures released in past years, the
first for 2011 outlines “hospitality” best practices,
which include, but are not limited to the following:
(1) companies should pay only for the expenditures of the government officials, not spouses or
other family members, (2) the company should
not play a role in selecting the government official
who will visit, (3) costs should be paid directly
to service providers, (4) companies should not
provide officials with cash or spending money,
(5) any souvenirs provided should have nominal
value, and (6) side trips and other nonbusinessrelated activities should not be funded by the
company.49
■■

Recordkeeping & Accounting Provisions

The recordkeeping and accounting provisions
of the FCPA require issuers of publicly traded
securities to maintain records and accounts that
accurately reflect the company’s transactions.50
The provisions also require an issuer to maintain
internal accounting controls sufficient to provide
reasonable assurance that its financial statements are
accurate.51 The purpose of the latter requirement is
to ensure a company detects and (preferably) preBriefing Papers © 2011 by Thomson Reuters
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vents violations of the FCPA. Moreover, because the
accounting requirements are based on a concept of
reasonableness and not materiality, the provisions
apply to all documents and records, regardless of the
dollar amount involved in the specific transaction.52
For example, Team Inc., a Texas industrial services
company, disclosed that it was internally investigating potential corrupt payments totaling at most,
$50,000.53 Moreover, in its disclosure, the company
explained that the total annual revenues from the
branch of the company involved in the improper
activity represented “approximately one-half of one
percent of our annual consolidated revenues.”54 Because there is no de minimis exception applicable to
the books-and-records provisions of the FCPA, the
company found itself spending approximately $3.2
million to investigate payments that were immaterial
to the company’s overall financial situation.55 This
example makes clear that companies must ensure
their books and records are accurate and must make
internal controls a priority.
The accounting and antibribery sections work
in tandem to prevent companies from hiding
bribes and other improper transactions off-therecord to conceal misconduct.56 There is, however,
no requirement that the accounting provisions
must be linked to the bribery of a foreign official.
Consequently, the Government may prosecute a
company for violating the accounting provisions,
even in the absence of a separate violation of the
antibribery provisions.57 In recent years, the SEC
has taken action against companies pursuant to
the accounting provisions of the Act, even when
the Government is unable to establish a violation of the antibribery provisions. For example,
in 2011, the SEC settled a civil action charging
NATCO Group, Inc. with violations of the booksand-records and internal control provisions of
the FCPA.58 In the NATCO action, the Government alleged that the company’s wholly owned
subsidiary, TEST Automation & Controls, Inc.,
“created and accepted false documents while
paying extorted immigration fines and obtaining
immigration visas in the Republic of Kazakhstan.”
Although the company made improper payments,
it was not charged with violating the antibribery
provisions.59 Instead, the Government alleged
that TEST violated the accounting provisions of
the FCPA when it falsely characterized the payments as a “salary advance.”60
5
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FCPA Jurisdiction
The FCPA’s prohibitions and requirements
have been construed broadly by the relevant
enforcement agencies, especially in regard to
its jurisdictional reach. The FCPA’s antibribery
prohibitions apply to any act “in furtherance of”
an improper payment taken within the United
States, regardless of the nationality of the party
engaging in the improper activity.61 Thus, the
antibribery provisions apply to both U.S. and foreign concerns, if the conduct occurs in any area
over which the United States asserts “territorial
jurisdiction.”62 Territorial jurisdiction also applies
to any issuer that has a class of securities (including American Depository Receipts) registered
pursuant to 15 U.S.C.A. § 78l or that is required
to file reports with the SEC under 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 78o(d).63 The antibribery provisions’ nationalitybased jurisdiction renders the statute applicable
to acts taken wholly outside the United States,
as long as a U.S. concern or issuer commits the
act.64 Jurisdiction under the accounting provisions of the FCPA extend only to individuals or
companies that meet the definition of “issuer.” 65
In recent enforcement actions, the Government has continued to expand FCPA jurisdiction,
especially in regard to foreign companies and
individuals. Since 1998, the FCPA antibribery
prohibitions have applied to both “issuer” and
non-“issuer” foreign companies and individuals
that commit an act in furtherance of the bribe
while in the territory of the United States.66 The
Government’s liberal interpretation of the FCPA’s
“in furtherance of” requirement has enabled the
Government to pursue foreign companies and
individuals, as long as they take some act within
the United States that facilitates or furthers the
improper payment.67 Indeed, eight of the eleven
top FCPA settlements in history involve foreign
companies (or persons).68 Recent enforcement
actions have demonstrated that the Government
will pursue foreign companies even when the act
“in furtherance of” the improper payment includes
a mere transfer through a correspondent account
in the United States. For example, in 2011, JGC
Corporation resolved FCPA allegations, agreeing to
a settlement including $218.8 million for the bribery
of Nigerian government officials.69 The Criminal
Information included allegations that JGC aided
6
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and abetted a co-conspirator in causing “corrupt
U.S. dollar payments” to be wire transferred from
a bank account in Amsterdam, “via correspondent
bank accounts in New York,” to bank accounts in
Switzerland, to be used, in part, for the bribery of
Nigerian government officials.70 The Government
has alleged jurisdiction on the basis of the use of
correspondent accounts in several other recent
enforcement actions as well, including against
Siemens,71 KBR,72 and Technip S.A.73
While most FCPA enforcement actions in recent
years have continued to push the boundaries of
the FCPA’s territorial jurisdiction, a recent case
indicates that there are limits to the reach of
the FCPA. When the U.S. Government charged
Pankesh Patel, a UK citizen, with violating the
FCPA, the Government predicated jurisdiction on
allegations that Patel mailed an original copy of
a purchase agreement relating to alleged corrupt
activity from the United Kingdom to the United
States.74 The court rejected this argument, granting
Patel’s Rule 29 acquittal motion, and noting that
because the mailing of the agreement occurred
in the United Kingdom, it was not “in the territory of the United States” and did not establish
jurisdiction under 15 U.S.C.A. § 78dd-3(a).75
While the Government’s broad interpretations
of jurisdiction are rarely tested, it is possible that
as more companies and individuals test these
theories in court, some limitations to the reach
of the FCPA may be established.

FCPA Sanctions
■■

Monetary Fines & Penalties

Recent enforcement actions indicate that a company’s failure to adequately monitor its business
practices overseas could cost it hundreds of millions
of dollars in fines and expenses. The consequences
are even more problematic for contractors that do
business with the U.S. Government, as an FCPA
violation could harm a contractor’s business with
the U.S. Government and foreign governments.
Contractors have substantial incentive to comply
with the FCPA given the potential penalties that
may result if they fail to do so.
The FCPA’s primary sanction for violations of
its provisions involves monetary fines, penalties,
Briefing Papers © 2011 by Thomson Reuters
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and incarceration. Penalties for corporations and
other business entities that violate the FCPA’s
antibribery provisions include a civil penalty of
up to $10,000 and a criminal fine of up to $2 million, while penalties for individuals include a civil
penalty of up to $10,000, a criminal fine of up to
$250,000, and five years’ imprisonment, for each
violation of the FCPA.76 In addition, the “Sentence
of fine” statute permits the Government to fine
persons up to twice the gross pecuniary gain or
loss resulting from the corrupt payment.77 These
fines and penalties are particularly difficult for
individuals, because employers are not permitted
to pay for their employees’ monetary penalties.78
Violations of the recordkeeping and internal
control provisions may result in civil penalties of
up to $500,000 for an entity and up to $100,000 for
an individual, or the gross amount of pecuniary
gain.79 Criminal violations of the recordkeeping
provisions carry a maximum fine of $25 million for
companies, and a $5 million fine and incarceration for up to 20 years for individuals.80 The SEC
also typically seeks disgorgement of any ill-gotten
gains associated with the improper activity.81
Recent FCPA enforcement actions indicate that
the Government is continuing to use monetary
penalties, disgorgement, forfeiture, and incarceration to deter other companies and individuals
from running afoul of the FCPA. The Government will continue to prosecute FCPA actions
in this manner, because “prosecuting individuals—and levying substantial criminal fines against
corporations—are the best ways to capture the
attention of the business community.”82 Indeed,
FCPA enforcement is responsible for nearly 50%
of the $2 billion in settlements and judgments
obtained by the Criminal Division of the DOJ in
2010.83 The SEC has been similarly active. Since
2010, the SEC has filed 32 FCPA cases and settled
enforcement actions resulting in more than $600
million in penalties, disgorgement, and interest.84
The Government’s message has been clear: if you
violate the FCPA, you will pay for it. The numbers
support this. In 2010, the DOJ and SEC imposed
over $1.7 billion in penalties and disgorgement
for violations of the FCPA—the highest year for
FCPA fines in history.85 In the past decade, the
dollar amounts have increased at a dramatic rate.
Briefing Papers © 2011 by Thomson Reuters
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Indeed, the top 10 FCPA corporate settlements of
all time were imposed between 2008–2011, with
Siemens AG holding the title of “most expensive
FCPA violation” to date.86
Company
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Siemens
Halliburton/KBR
BAE
Snamprogetti
Technip
JGC Corporation
Daimler
Alcatel-Lucent
Panalpina
J&J

Date of
Settlement
12/12/08
2/11/09
3/1/10
7/7/10
6/28/10
4/6/11
4/1/10
12/27/10
11/4/10
4/8/11

DOJ
$450,000,000
402,000,000
400,000,000
240,000,000
240,000,000
218,800,000
93,600,000
92,000,000
70,560,000
21,400,000

SEC

Total

$350,000,000
177,000,000
0
125,000,000
98,000,000
0
91,400,000
45,372,000
11,300,000
48,600,000

$800,000,000
579,000,000
400,000,000
365,000,000
338,000,000
218,800,000
185,000,000
137,372,000
81,890,000
70,000,000

The top 10 corporate settlements total nearly
$3.2 billion in fines and penalties. Fines against
individuals are similarly large. Between 1998 and
October 2010, more than $2 billion in criminal
fines were imposed against individuals.87 This number includes several sizable monetary payouts by
individuals, including the eighth most expensive
FCPA enforcement action to date against Jeffrey
Tesler, totaling $148,964,568.88
The Government also continues to exploit the
other monetary remedies available to it, such as
disgorgement. In fact, from 2004 to date, over $1
billion has been disgorged.89 Disgorgement is an
equitable remedy used to prevent an entity from
profiting from illegal activities by stripping it of
any ill-gotten gains it may have received as a result
of the improper activity.90 The SEC currently uses
disgorgement as an enforcement tool in a majority
of the FCPA matters it settles. Because disgorgement is not considered punitive, the SEC may
only disgorge “the approximate amount earned
from the alleged illicit activities.”91 FCPA-related
disgorgements can total hundreds of millions of
dollars, as with Siemens ($350 million),92 KBR
($177 million),93 and Snamprogetti ($125 million).94
The Government may also subject FCPA violators
to another financial blow—forfeiture. “Forfeiture”
permits the Government to seize a wide variety of
assets, including money judgments, property, and
substitute assets.95 The Government will use “substitute assets” when the proceeds of a defendant’s
illegal act are unrecoverable as the result of the
defendant’s acts or omissions.96 Although traditionally considered to be a rarely used sanction,
recent FCPA enforcement actions suggest that this
7
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is no longer the case. For example, after paying
bribes to Nigerian government officials for nearly
decade to obtain engineering, procurement, and
construction contracts, Jeffrey Tesler, a former
consultant to KBR and its joint venture partners,
pleaded guilty to conspiracy to violate the FCPA
and agreed to forfeit $148,964,568—the largest
FCPA-related forfeiture involving an individual
in history.97 Similarly, when Gerald and Patricia
Green, former Hollywood film executives, were
convicted of nine counts of violating the FCPA
and seven counts of money laundering for their
payment of approximately $1.8 million in bribes
to the former governor of the Tourism Authority
of Thailand,98 in addition to other sanctions and
remedies, the court imposed a personal money
judgment of criminal forfeiture in the amount of
$1,049,465, plus the amount of each defendant’s
share of their pension plans.99 The defendants
could not satisfy this order, so the Government
filed a motion seeking substitute assets in the form
of Patricia Green’s West Hollywood residence.100
The sanctions and forfeiture eventually rendered
the defendants indigent, claiming the couple’s
savings, home, car, company, and pension assets.101
The Government is also using forfeiture as a
means to recover illegal bribes from the foreign
government officials who accept them. Attorney
General Eric Holder has made clear that through
the “enforcement of [the United States’] asset
forfeiture laws,” recovering the bribes accepted
by foreign officials is “a global imperative.”102 For
example, in 2010, Robert Antoine, the former
director of international affairs for Haiti’s stateowned national telecommunications company,
Telecommunications D’Haiti, pleaded guilty to
conspiracy to commit money laundering.103 In
his plea agreement, Antoine admitted to accepting bribes from three U.S. telecommunications
companies and laundering them through intermediary companies.104 In addition to a four-year
prison sentence and the payment of $1,852,209
in restitution, the U.S. Government was able to
recover the illegal proceeds of this bribery scheme
by ordering Antoine to forfeit $1,580,771.105
■■

Incarceration

In addition to monetary penalties and remedies,
the most dramatic trend in recent FCPA actions
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involves the incarceration of individuals who violate the FCPA. The Government has made clear
that FCPA violations may result in “very serious
penalties, which can include substantial prison
time for individuals who violate the law.”106 The
prison terms have been significant. In April 2011,
Charles Paul Edward Jumet, an officer of Ports
Engineering Consultants Corporation, received
an 87-month prison sentence—the longest prison
sentence ever associated with an FCPA matter.107
Jumet pleaded guilty to conspiring to violate the
FCPA by conspiring to pay more than $200,000
in bribes to Panamanian government officials in
exchange for contracts to maintain lighthouses
and buoys along Panama’s waterway.108 Jumet also
made a false statement to federal agents about
the true nature of a check used to corruptly pay
a Panamanian government official.109 Similarly,
the former chairman and chief executive officer of KBR, Albert “Jack” Stanley, agreed to an
84-month prison term when he pleaded guilty to
conspiracy to violate the FCPA and conspiracy to
commit mail and wire fraud.110 Stanley admitted to
authorizing a joint venture that paid nearly $200
million in bribes to Nigerian officials to obtain
$6 billion in Nigerian construction contracts to
build liquefied natural gas facilities on Bonny
Island, Nigeria.111
In many cases, judges have ordered prison sentences far lighter than what was initially sought by
the Government. For example, prosecutors in the
case against Patricia and Gerald Green sought a
10-year prison term for both defendants, though
they each received only six-month terms.112 Leo
Winston Smith, former director of sales and
marketing for Pacific Consolidated Industries,
pleaded guilty to bribing a government official
in the UK Ministry of Defense.113 Despite the
Government’s 37-month recommendation, Mr.
Smith received a six-month prison term with an
additional six months of home confinement.114
Prosecutors sought a 168–210 month sentence for
Nam Nguyen115 for bribing government officials
in Vietnam to secure high-tech contracts, but
he was only sentenced to 16 months, 116 while his
co-defendant An Nguyen received nine months
for his role in the bribery scheme, 117 despite the
87–108 months recommended by prosecutors.118
While a variety of factors may be the cause of this
frequent downward departure by judges (e.g.,
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health or age of the defendant), judges may be
revealing a bias against lengthy prison terms for
cases involving foreign bribery. What is clear,
however, is that the Government will continue
to seek lengthy prison terms as both a deterrent
against corruption and bargaining chip in its
plea negotiations with individuals.

FCPA Collateral Consequences
While the threat of fines, penalties, disgorgement, and incarceration are sufficient to deter
most companies from bribing officials to obtain
business with foreign governments, companies
that contract with the Government have even
more to lose if they are caught making illicit
payments. For contractors, their livelihood is
at risk, because suspension or debarment from
selling goods or services to the United States
(and other government entities) is a potential
collateral consequence of violating the FCPA.
■■

U.S. Suspension & Debarment Regime

The U.S. suspension and debarment regime
is designed to protect taxpayer dollars by ensuring that the Government does business only
with responsible firms.119 Both suspension and
debarment are extraordinary tools, empowering
the Government with the authority to suspend a
contractor for up to a year 120 or debar a contractor for up to three years.121 Neither suspension
nor debarment is meant to be punitive—they are
designed to ensure that the Government does
business only with ethical and honest companies.
A company’s exclusion from the U.S. procurement regime may be as broad or as limited as
the Government deems necessary to protect its
interests, ranging from the debarment of the
entire company to the debarment of a division,
facility, or even a single individual.122
While the terms “suspension” and “debarment”
are often used interchangeably, they differ in
scope and procedure. The decision to suspend
or debar hinges on the ability to demonstrate
“present responsibility,” which requires, among
other things, a “satisfactory record of integrity
and business ethics.”123 Suspension is a temporary
exclusion from contracting, triggered by “adequate
evidence” of an offense or misconduct that either
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indicates a lack of business integrity or is so serious that it affects the “present responsibility” of a
contractor.124 Some agencies consider an indictment of such misconduct, such as the bribery of
a foreign official, to be adequate evidence of a
lack of present responsibility (though it is not
required).125 In contrast, debarment is a more
permanent status, requiring a “preponderance
of evidence” of misconduct or the commission of
an offense that indicates either a lack of business
integrity or is so serious that it affects the “present responsibility” of a contractor.126 An agency
may debar a contractor based on a conviction
or civil judgment for various offenses, including
the bribery of a foreign official, but neither is
required.127
Any agency may suspend or debar a contractor,
but once an agency has made that determination,
all agencies must abide by that agency’s decision
(absent negotiated exceptions). In other words, if
a contractor is suspended by the U.S. Air Force,
“it cannot do business with the Navy, [the National Aeronautics and Space Administration],
the [General Services Administration], or any of
the other approximately 125 Executive Branch
agencies or departments.”128 Thus, once a company
is either suspended or debarred, it is completely
excluded from both obtaining contracts directly
with the Government and subcontract work under
prime contracts with the Government.129 Notably,
because the system is not designed to punish contractors, suspension or debarment only applies
to future contracts, task orders, and options to
extend current contracts—neither suspension
nor debarment affects existing contract work
with the Government.130
Once a contractor is either suspended or debarred, its status as a blacklisted company is made
public through a variety of mechanisms. First,
suspended and debarred contractors are publicly
listed on the Excluded Party Listing Service.131
All contracting officials are required to review
the EPLS prior to award, and prime contractors
are prohibited from awarding subcontracts to
contractors on this list as well. The EPLS is even
often relied upon by state and local governments,
which often refuse to work with any contractor
listed on the EPLS. While there are no free, publicly available databases that monitor state and
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local debarments, there are privately maintained
databases that are available to the public for a
fee.132
Even if a contractor is neither suspended nor
debarred, its alleged violation of the FCPA may
be added to the company’s profile in several
other databases. The Federal Government now
maintains a Federal Awardee Performance and
Integrity Information System (FAPIIS), developed to maintain “specific information on the
integrity and performance of covered Federal
agency contractors and grantees,” such as contract
terminations, past performance, responsibility
determinations, administrative agreements, or
criminal, civil, or administration actions involving
the contractor. 133 Similar to the EPLS database,
Contracting Officers are supposed to use FAPIIS
to review a company’s history, including any past
misconduct, before awarding a contract.134 In
addition to the Government-maintained FAPIIS
database, the Project on Governmental Oversight (POGO) maintains a Federal Contractor
Misconduct Database (FCMD), which contains
“histories of misconduct such as contract fraud
and environmental, ethics, and labor violations.”135
The FCMD “is a compilation of misconduct and
alleged misconduct committed by the top Federal Government contractors between January 1,
1995, and the present,” including civil, criminal,
or administrative settlements.136 No contractor
wants to find itself listed in a publicly available
database alongside companies that have behaved
in a disreputable manner. These databases may
not only harm a contractor’s reputation, they can
also potentially harm a contractor’s Government
business. Contracting Officers tasked to work with
only responsible contractors137 may be deterred
from working with contractors that have blemished
records. Moreover, because the information in
these databases is available to the public, media
and congressional pressure may influence agencies to avoid contracting with FCPA violators.
What makes suspension and debarment a particularly complicated collateral consequence of the
FCPA, is that it is not a coordinated regime—the
authority to take such action does not lie with
the FCPA enforcement agencies—it resides with
any one of the procuring agencies and binds all
other agencies to the determination. Moreover,
10

2011

★

any agency can suspend or debar a contractor
at any time, regardless of the recommendation
of the DOJ. If a contractor has committed an
offense, such as bribery, an agency is unlikely
to find the contractor “presently responsible,”
unless the contractor can demonstrate that the
bribery was limited to a division or subsidiary of
the company that does not do business with the
U.S. Government. Even then, a contractor must
still convince the Government that the violation
of the FCPA was an isolated incident and has no
bearing on the company’s Government business.
Consequently, a contractor’s behavior following
the discovery of the misconduct, its level of cooperation with the Government, and any remedial
measures it has taken, become essential to its
survival.
The risk of suspension and debarment places
contractors in an unfortunate position when an
FCPA violation is uncovered. Because the DOJ
lacks the authority to prevent the suspension
or debarment of a contractor, contractors must
proceed cautiously to avoid any of the likely suspension and debarment triggers. If, for example,
a legal proceeding (such as an indictment) has
been formally initiated by the DOJ, any procuring
agency may suspend that contractor until the legal
proceeding has finished—including any and all
appeals.138 It is therefore obvious why many U.S.
contractors try to eliminate this risk as quickly as
possible through settlement negotiations.
Notably, while a company may resolve an FCPA
matter with the DOJ by settlement agreement
to avoid a criminal charge or conviction, these
agreements are not a guaranteed shield against
suspension or debarment. The Government
has been clear that neither type of settlement
agreement will preclude a company’s suspension or debarment, as the agreements bind
only the DOJ.139 It is, however, possible for the
DOJ to agree to make “representations about a
company’s criminal conduct and remediation
measures to a government contracting agency”
to help the company avoid suspension and debarment.140 Thus, it is common for the Government
to use the threat of suspension and debarment
to extract extraordinary fines and penalties from
companies in exchange for their support during negotiations with debarment officials from
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other agencies. Indeed, if a company agrees to
cooperate, the DOJ may even agree to insert an
affirmative statement in the settlement documents
attesting to a company’s present responsibility.
For example, in 2010, Daimler AG resolved bribery allegations in which the Government alleged
that the company “engaged in a long-standing
practice of paying bribes to foreign officials…in at
least 22 countries…to assist in securing contracts
with government customers for the purchase of
Daimler vehicles valued at hundreds of millions
of dollars.”141 In its deferred prosecution agreement with the DOJ, the Government included a
provision that stated:142
With respect to Daimler’s present reliability and
responsibility as a government contractor, the
Department agrees to cooperate with Daimler, in
a form and manner to be agreed, in bringing facts
relating to the nature of the conduct underlying
this Agreement and to Daimler’s cooperation and
remediation to the attention of governmental and
other debarment authorities.

The DOJ’s ability to work with a company to
avoid suspension and debarment is significant
leverage given the potentially devastating consequences that either could have on a company.
Many companies would rather cooperate with
the DOJ than suffer the consequences that might
stem from an indictment or guilty verdict. As
such, it is no surprise that nearly all companies
settle FCPA charges with the Government rather
than challenge them in court.
In recent years, criticism has been levied against
the Government for its failure to use the suspension and debarment tools when companies settle
FCPA or FCPA-related matters.143 Specifically, commentators and lawmakers have complained that
when U.S. Government contractors are involved
in an FCPA enforcement matter, “an agreement
by DOJ to intervene on the company’s behalf in
any collateral proceedings, such as suspension and
debarment, is a staple of deferred prosecution
agreements.”144 While the indignation is currently
directed towards the suspension and debarment
regime in the context of the FCPA, the regime itself,
even in matters unrelated to the FCPA, has long
been criticized as an impotent enforcement tool.145
It is not surprising that this tool is underutilized,
as the Government depends on a relatively small
number of contractors to supply a majority of its
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goods and services. Indeed, “with fewer major,
critical contractors available to compete for the
Government’s most sophisticated requirements, it
seems disingenuous to bar a key player from future
competition.”146 In fact, although BAE Systems
PLC admitted to (1) conspiring to defraud the
United States by impairing and impeding its lawful functions, (2) making false statements about
its FCPA compliance program, and (3) violating
the Arms Export Control Act and International
Traffic in Arms Regulations when it actually (allegedly) bribed government officials in exchange
for billions of dollars worth of defense contracts,
the U.S. Government still awarded it over $6.6
billion in contracts in FY 2010.147 Critics may
continue to gripe about the current state of the
suspension and debarment regime, but the takeaway is clear: companies that provide unique and
important goods and services to the Government
are highly unlikely to be suspended or debarred
as the result of an FCPA violation. As such, the
critics’ demands are not only impractical; they
demonstrate a fundamental misunderstanding of
the U.S. suspension and debarment regime. The
decision to suspend or debar is a business decision
“that requires a weighing of the risks and benefits
to the Government of contracting with an ethically
questionable firm.”148 The Government, therefore,
has determined in recent matters that the benefits
to working with contractors that have violated the
FCPA outweigh the risks. Moreover, requiring
the mandatory debarment of companies that are
found to have violated the FCPA could substantially
deter companies from disclosing wrongdoing,
remedying problems, and improving compliance
systems. 149 Indeed, “linking mandatory debarment
to a criminal resolution would fundamentally alter
the incentives of a contractor-company to reach
an FCPA resolution because such a resolution
would likely lead to the cessation of revenues for
a government contractor— a virtual death knell
for the contractor-company.” Similarly, mandatory debarment would have a negative impact on
prosecutorial discretion—eliminating the flexibility
necessary to fashion an appropriate resolution
depending on the particular matter.150
■■

Denial Of Other U.S. Public Advantages

In addition to debarment from the U.S. procurement regime, a company that violates the
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FCPA may be ineligible to receive certain other
“public advantages” from the Government, such
as grants, loans, subsidies, or insurance.151 Likewise, a contractor may be excluded from various
other Government programs, such as those found
in agencies like the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission and the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation.152 Similarly, the Export-Import Bank
may also decline, among other things, applications for export credit as the result of a company’s
fraudulent or corrupt activity.153 Another potential collateral consequence of an FCPA violation
is the possible loss of Government licenses. This
sanction could have an even more devastating
impact on a contractor than debarment, as the
denial of necessary licenses would likely affect
not only a company’s Government sales, but its
commercial sector business as well.154 In addition,
a company could have its Government security
or facility clearances155 revoked as the result of
its violation of the FCPA—a sanction that could
render the company ineligible for any current or
future contracts containing such requirements.
The denial of arms export licenses under § 38
of the AECA156 is another possible outcome when
an applicant has been indicted for or convicted
of violating the FCPA.157 In addition, § 120.1 of
the ITAR expressly states that licenses or other
approvals may not be granted to entities indicted
for, or convicted of, violating the FCPA.158 Following BAE’s $400 million FCPA-related settlement
with the DOJ, the U.S. Department of State announced that it entered into a civil settlement
with BAE Systems for 2,591 alleged violations
of the AECA and ITAR “in connection with the
unauthorized brokering of U.S. defense articles
and services, failure to register as a broker, failure
to file annual broker reports, causing unauthorized brokering, failure to report the payment
of fees or commissions associated with defense
transactions, and the failure to maintain records
involving ITAR-controlled transactions.”159 The
settlement required BAE to pay $79 million in
fines and remedial compliance measures—the
largest civil penalty in State Department history.160
Because of BAE’s criminal conviction, the State
Department imposed a statutory debarment on
BAE, but concurrently rescinded the order, after
determining that “appropriate steps had been
taken to mitigate law enforcement concerns.”161
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The Department also released an administrative
hold that it had placed on BAE’s license authorization requests immediately following the company’s
conviction. The agency did, however, impose a
“policy of denial” on three BAE subsidiaries that
were substantially involved in the activities that
led to the company’s conviction. This means that
there is “an initial presumption of denial” for all
applications from the impacted entities absent a
determination by the State Department that “it is
in the foreign policy or national security interests
of the United States to provide an approval.”162

Global Antibribery Enforcement &
Collateral Consequences
Government contractors with a global presence must not only worry about compliance
with the FCPA, they also must be aware of the
antibribery laws in other countries as well. In
recent years, numerous other countries have
implemented more aggressive antibribery regimes
and are actively investigating and prosecuting
bribery cases. For example, the UK Bribery
Act, in force since July 1, 2011, is currently the
cause of greatest concern to companies that do
business in the United Kingdom, because its
provisions are broad, relatively undefined, and
prohibit activities beyond those prohibited by
the FCPA. Similar to the FCPA, the UK Bribery
Act prohibits the bribery of foreign officials,
but it also prohibits commercial bribery and
the failure of a commercial organization to
prevent bribery. 163 Also unlike the FCPA, the
Bribery Act extends jurisdiction over bribe
recipients. 164 The UK Bribery Act is causing
further difficulty for companies that do business
in both the United States and United Kingdom
because it does not permit facilitation payments
or allow an affirmative defense for hospitality
expenditures. As such, companies are strongly
advised to review and update their bribery policies and compliance programs to ensure they
comply not only with the FCPA, but with the
new heightened standards provided by the UK
Bribery Act (and the bribery laws in any other
country in which the company does business).
In addition to the penalties associated with
the violation of a foreign country’s antibribery
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laws, contractors may also be debarred from
doing business with a foreign government. If a
company violates the FCPA (or another country’s antibribery laws), debarment from government procurement contracts in Europe is also
a potential consequence. Article 45 of the EU
Public Sector Procurement Directive requires
contractors convicted of any of the following
crimes to be debarred from public procurement:
(1) participation in a criminal organization,
(2) corruption, (3) fraud, or (4) money laundering.165 This is a punitive regime under which
debarment is mandatory and is designed to deter
corruption and bribery in public procurement
activities.166 The mandatory debarment trigger is
clear: “conviction by final judgment of which the
contracting authority is aware.”167 This stringent
penalty provides an even greater incentive for
companies that violate antibribery laws to settle
with the Government—they do not want to lose
their contracts with the EU member states. While
there is an exception for “overriding requirements
in the general interest,” it is unclear whether
authorities would permit an exception to the
mandatory debarment rules for a company that
violates the FCPA or other antibribery laws. 168 In
addition, even if a contractor is not “convicted”
of violating such a law, it may still be prohibited
from contracting with an EU member state. Section 2 of Article 45 also describes a discretionary
debarment trigger under which contractors may
be excluded for a variety of other reasons, including “grave professional misconduct.”169

Recent FCPA-related settlements have demonstrated that government officials in both
the United States and Europe may go to great
lengths to prevent a valuable contractor from
being excluded by the EU mandatory debarment
provisions, as “there is a growing recognition that
the [European Union] debarment requirement
presents particular challenges for companies
trying to settle cases.”174 As a result, the Government considers “collateral consequences when
structuring settlement agreements.” 175 The Government’s settlement with BAE exemplifies this
issue. Despite widespread allegations of bribery,
neither the U.S. nor UK governments charged BAE
with violating the countries’ relevant antibribery
laws. Thus, neither settlement agreement triggered mandatory debarment—a clear goal of the
two countries, given that debarment could “ruin
BAE, which employs more than 100,000 people
and is the biggest supplier to the British Armed
Forces.”176 In this instance, the U.S. Government
extracted an extraordinary $400 million criminal
fine from BAE, the third highest FCPA settlement
in history, in exchange for lesser charges that
would not implicate the mandatory debarment
regime. Indeed, the BAE Sentencing Memorandum expressly explains that the settlement was
structured for this reason, noting that:177

The mandatory debarment provisions have been
implemented in the United Kingdom through
Regulation 23(1) of the Public Contracts Regulations 2006170 and Regulation 26(1) of the Utilities Contracts Regulations 2006.171 Moreover, in
June 2011, the UK Ministry of Justice published
amended legislation relating to the Bribery Act
making clear that mandatory debarment will be
a likely collateral consequence of a conviction
under §§ 1 and 6 of the Bribery Act—the bribery
of another person or a foreign public official,
respectively.172 Conversely, the MOJ has stated
publicly that a corporation’s conviction under
§ 7 of the Bribery Act—failure of a commercial
organization to prevent bribery—may only result
in discretionary debarment.173

The Department will communicate with
U.S. debarment and regulatory authorities, and
relevant foreign authorities, if requested to do
so, regarding the nature of the offense of which
BAES has been convicted, the conduct engaged
in by BAES, its remediation efforts, and the facts
relevant to an assessment of whether BAES is
presently a responsible Government contractor.
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Mandatory exclusion under EU debarment
regulations is unlikely in light of the nature of the
charge to which BAES is pleading. Discretionary
debarment will presumably be considered and
determined by various suspension and debarment
officials.

Recent settlements with Siemens AG and Daimler
AG were similarly structured to avoid implicating
the mandatory debarment regime.178

Debarment By Other International
Organizations
Other international organizations may also
suspend or debar contractors if the company or
13

★

AUGUST

BRIEFING PAPERS

2011

★

individual is found to have violated the FCPA. For
example, the World Bank may debar any firms or
entities that have been found “to have engaged
in fraudulent, corrupt, collusive, coercive or obstructive practices.”179 In fact, “debarment with
conditional release has become the default or
‘baseline’” sanction for such actions.180 Similar to
the United States, the World Bank also maintains
a list of debarred contractors that renders the
companies and individuals on the list “ineligible
to be awarded a World Bank-financed contract”
for the period of debarment.181

struction and Development, the Inter-American
Development Bank Group, and the World Bank
Group—entered into an “Agreement For Mutual
Enforcement of Debarment Decisions,” under
which a company or individual debarred by one
bank may be debarred from contracting with all
five development banks, as long as the debarment exceeds a period of one year and relates
to corruption.189 This agreement is made even
more effective by its disclosure requirements: all
five institutions are required to notify each other
when they have debarred a contractor.190

Historically, the World Bank has demonstrated
that it is far more likely than its government counterparts to debar a company in response to corrupt
behavior. For example, the World Bank exercised its
debarment authority against Siemens after Siemens
settled its FCPA violations with the United States.182
Specifically, Siemens AG and its affiliates entered
into a settlement agreement with the “World Bank
Group,”183 under which it agreed to, among other
things, debarment from all projects, programs, or
other investments financed or guaranteed by the
World Bank for at least two years and a payment
of $100 million over 15 years to support global efforts to fight fraud and corruption.184 In a separate
proceeding, the World Bank debarred Siemens
Russia OOO, a subsidiary of Siemens AG, for four
years for “having engaged in fraudulent and corrupt practices in relation to a World Bank-financed
project”185 The World Bank Group permitted Siemens to continue working on existing contracts,
though it required the company to withdraw all
bids that had not been accepted by the start of the
debarment period.186 Similarly, the World Bank
debarred Macmillan, a UK-based publisher, after
it admitted to bribing officials in Sudan to win a
World Bank-related contract to print educational
material.187 The debarment has rendered Macmillan ineligible from Bank-financed contracts for six
years.188

In addition to MDBs, other institutions may refuse
to do business with a company that violates the FCPA.
For example, a company may be suspended from
doing business with the United Nations Secretariat
Procurement Division if it violates the FCPA.191 A
year after Siemens settled its FCPA violations with
the U.S. Government, Siemens announced that
the Vendor Review Committee of the UNPD was
suspending Siemens from the UNPD vendor database for a minimum period of six months.192

Debarment from a multilateral bank is now
even a greater risk to companies that have violated the FCPA given a recent action taken by
the heads of leading multilateral development
banks to purge corrupt companies and individuals
from their projects. On April 9, 2010, the leading
MDBs—the African Development Bank, the Asian
Development Bank, the European Bank for Recon14

Other Costs Associated With FCPA
Enforcement
While the Government has a mighty arsenal of
penalties and sanctions that it can impose on companies that run afoul of the FCPA, they are not the
only costs a company could face should it uncover
evidence of questionable payments. For example,
an internal investigation could cost a company millions of dollars. In 2009, Team Inc. disclosed that
an internal investigation uncovered questionable
payments totaling no more than $50,000.193 In a
filing with the SEC, the company noted that it had
spent approximately $3.2 million in investigationrelated expenses, such as legal fees.194 The SEC
notified Team in 2011 that it did not intend to
impose fines or penalties on the company.195 The
DOJ similarly indicated that it was unlikely to take
formal action against the company, though it has yet
to formally close the investigation.196 The company,
therefore, spent $3.2 million—an amount 64 times
greater than the $50,000 the company allegedly
paid to obtain an improper business advantage, to
investigate allegations that the Government did not
deem worthy of prosecution. This example makes
clear that for many companies, the costs associated
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with a discovered FCPA violation may far exceed
any benefit obtained by the bribe.
Similarly, when Avon Products Inc. received
notice of an allegation that “certain travel,
entertainment and other expenses may have
been improperly incurred in connection with
the Company’s China operations,” it launched
an internal investigation that, according to the
company’s own disclosures, has cost them over
$150 million dollars to date.197 While the initial
allegation involved only the company’s activities
in China, the investigation soon expanded to the
company’s operations in other countries.198 Thus,
it is possible that by the time Avon finishes its
investigation and begins settlement negotiations
with the Government, the cost of the internal
investigation alone will top $250 million.199
Other collateral expenses may result from the
disclosure of an FCPA investigation in an SEC
filing. In particular, this type of disclosure may
result in a substantial decrease in the company’s
stock price, profits, or sales, generating yet
another FCPA-related cost. For example, when
Avon disclosed its investigation into bribery allegations in China, its shares dropped 8%.200
When Faro Technologies Inc. disclosed that it
was close to settling an FCPA enforcement action
with the DOJ and SEC, the company directly attributed a drop in profits to its announcement
regarding the pending FCPA settlement.201 When
weapons maker Smith & Wesson announced an
internal investigation into potential violations
of the FCPA, the company soon discovered that
the announcement negatively affected its sales,
disclosing that “[p]istol sales decreased 25.3%,
driven by the reduction in consumer demand as
well as reduced international shipments related
to our investigation of the FCPA matter.”202
Companies may also face additional expenditures stemming from collateral civil litigation.
While there is no private right of action under
the FCPA,203 companies are now finding that after
they announce an investigation into allegations
of improper conduct, or even after they settle
their FCPA-related enforcement actions, they
may become the target of lawsuits, including
but not limited to, securities fraud actions and
shareholder derivative suits. While the success of
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these suits has varied, some collateral litigation
has resulted in enormous payouts to the plaintiffs: Willbros Group settled for $10.5 million,
Nature’s Sunshine settled for $6 million, and Faro
Technologies settled for $6.9 million.204 Avon is
also currently the target of a number of securities
fraud and shareholder derivative actions alleging “breaches of various fiduciary duties for not
properly monitoring the company’s operations
and securities violations for not making proper
disclosure of the problems.”205 Whether these suits
will be successful remains to be seen, but Avon
stands as a cautionary tale to other companies
that do business overseas. One can only assume
that by the time the dust settles, Avon’s total bill
for all FCPA-related activity will be astronomical.

The Road To Settlement
Any contractor that discovers evidence of a
potential violation of the FCPA must be prepared
to take immediate action to avoid, or at least
minimize, the fines, penalties, and collateral
consequences that may result. Should a company
become aware of a potential violation of the
FCPA, its first course of action should be a swift
and thorough investigation into the allegation.
Companies should not prolong an investigation,
as they must demonstrate that they take their
employees’ claims seriously. Indeed, companies
that ignore allegations may run the risk that an
employee will disclose the alleged violation to
the Government through, among other available mechanisms, the SEC’s new whistleblower
program, under which a whistleblower who
voluntarily provides original information about
a potential FCPA violation to the SEC that leads
to the successful enforcement of an administrative action could potentially receive a reward of
between 10%–30% of a monetary sanction levied
against the company in excess of $1 million.206
This new regime highlights the importance of
adopting company policies designed to effectively
manage internal complaints and allegations. Specifically, an effective policy must make clear that
employee complaints will be taken seriously, kept
confidential, and will not result in retaliation.207
Although in-house counsel may initially verify
that an allegation has some factual basis, a
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company’s best course of action is to hire experienced and independent outside FCPA counsel
to thoroughly investigate the allegations. The
outside counsel’s independence is imperative,
as a company never knows where the trail may
lead, or who in the company may be implicated
by the allegations. Moreover, federal enforcement authorities view investigations completed
by in-house counsel skeptically, often considering them to be unreliable—especially if the
results are favorable to company management
or counsel. 208 A company seeking to make a
good first impression with the SEC and the
DOJ can avoid these issues by simply retaining
independent counsel from the outset—or risk
the Government launching its own investigation into the allegations.
Should a company’s internal investigation uncover a potential violation of the FCPA, it must
decide whether it will disclose the results of the
internal investigation to Government authorities. While companies are not required by law
to voluntarily disclose potential FCPA violations,
they usually do so based on legal, financial, and
reputational considerations. Moreover, with the
threat of the new SEC whistleblower program,
companies may find that disclosure is the only
appropriate course of action in certain instances.
Self-reporting potential FCPA violations is a
common course of action for companies. In fact,
the DOJ estimates that roughly 50% of its current
FCPA investigations derive from voluntary disclosures.209 Companies that do disclose allegations
must be aware that cooperation does not cease at
disclosure. Rather, companies must be prepared to
cooperate fully with the Government throughout
the entire enforcement process, including the initial disclosure, a potentially lengthy investigation
phase, and settlement negotiations. The Government has long urged companies to self-report,
claiming that a company will receive credit for its
disclosure and cooperation. While in the past, it
was often difficult to determine whether companies had, in fact, benefited from disclosure, recent
FCPA settlements support the Government’s claim.
For example, the recent settlement of Johnson &
Johnson’s FCPA enforcement action is an example
of how the Government may reward cooperation.
Although Johnson & Johnson admitted to bribing
16
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“publicly-employed health care providers in Greece,
Poland and Romania,” and paying kickbacks “to
the former government of Iraq under the United
Nations Oil for Food program,” the Government
praised the company for its cooperation and for
playing an “important role in identifying improper
practices in the life sciences industry.”210 The DOJ’s
press release further describes how it credited the
company for its disclosure and cooperation, explaining that because of the company’s voluntary disclosure, and extensive cooperation, self investigation,
remedial efforts, and compliance improvements,
the company received a reduced fine and was not
required to retain a corporate monitor.211
Most FCPA allegations that have been investigated by the Government have resulted in a
form of settlement, including nonprosecution
agreements, deferred prosecution agreements,
a consent decree, or a combination of one or
more of these types of agreements. Nonprosecution agreements “typically are not filed with the
court, but instead are maintained by DOJ and the
corporation,” while deferred prosecution agreements are “typically filed with the court, along
with a document that identifies the charges that
the prosecution has brought against the corporation.212 Nonprosecution agreements and deferred
prosecution agreements both typically provide a
detailed account of companies’ alleged wrongdoing and require companies “to comply with a set
of terms for a specified duration in exchange for
prosecutors deferring the decision to prosecute or
deciding not to prosecute.”213 Terms may require
a company to improve its compliance program,
hire an independent compliance monitor, or
make monetary payments ranging from fines
and penalties to forfeiture and restitution.”214
The agreements also typically reserve the right
to take action against a company at a later date
should the company fail to follow through with
its compliance obligations or if further violations
are discovered.215
While the Government will often require a company to retain an independent compliance monitor
as a condition of settling an enforcement action,
recent settlement agreements suggest that this
practice may be on the decline. The Government
has received substantial criticism in recent years
about the costs of retaining a corporate monitor,
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as Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle recently noted during a hearing to approve a company’s guilty plea:
“It’s an outrage, that people get $50 million to be a
monitor…. It’s a boondoggle.”216 Indeed, a recent
Government Accountability Office report noted
some monitors’ rates range from $290 per hour
to $895 per hour, with the total cost per month
ranging from $8,000 to $2.1 million .217
Perhaps responding to criticism about the excessive
costs associated with monitors, recent FCPA settlements have required compliance monitors in fewer
matters, signaling a move towards simply requiring
companies to self-police and report directly to the
Government.218 A review of recent FCPA enforcement actions reveals that only one of the seven
FCPA settlements announced by the DOJ between
January and mid-July of 2011 involved the appointment of an independent compliance consultant.219
The Johnson & Johnson FCPA settlement is instructive, as the DOJ press release describes several of
the factors that the Government considered when
deciding not to impose a compliance monitor:
(1) the company had a preexisting compliance
and ethics programs, (2) the company engaged
in the extensive remediation and improvement of
its compliance systems and internal controls, and
(3) the company agreed to enhanced compliance
undertakings.220 In lieu of a corporate monitor, the
agreement requires the company to report directly
to the DOJ regarding the “implementation of its
remediation and enhanced compliance efforts every
six months for the duration of the agreement.”221
Whether the recent shift away from compliance
monitors is an actual trend that will be present in
future settlements remains to be seen.
While companies and the Government often
prefer negotiated settlements, whether the settlement actually provides tangible benefit to a contractor often depends not only on the company’s
cooperation, but the compliance programs in
place at the time of settlement.222 The ability to
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demonstrate an effective compliance program
is particularly important for U.S. Government
contractors, which will be required to demonstrate “present responsibility” if they wish to avoid
suspension and debarment. Moreover, even if a
company has a written FCPA compliance policy
in place, it must be more than a “paper program”
that exists without the proper internal controls to
enforce it. As the Siemens matter demonstrated,
having a written FCPA policy is worthless if the
company fails to dedicate proper resources to
its compliance program, routinely ignores FCPA
“red flags,” and fails to punish wrongdoers.223
Although FCPA enforcement has been widely
criticized for its lack of judicial review and frequent
use of settlement agreements to resolve potential
FCPA violations, the Government’s use of these
negotiated agreements continues to grow each
year. In fact, while the SEC has traditionally settled
alleged violations of the FCPA with cease-and-desist
orders, in 2010, the SEC announced that it would
begin using cooperation agreements, such as nonprosecution agreements and deferred prosecution
agreements, in its resolution of alleged violations
of the FCPA.224 The SEC entered into its first deferred prosecution agreement with Tenaris S.A. in
May 2011.225 The deferred prosecution agreement
alleges that Tenaris bribed government officials
in Uzbekistan in exchange for contracts that resulted in a $5 million profit for the company.226 In
resolving the matter with the Government, Tenaris
agreed to pay $5.4 million in disgorgement and
prejudgment interest under its deferred prosecution
agreement with the SEC, and another $3.5 million
in criminal penalties under its nonprosecution
agreement with the DOJ. The SEC explained that
Tenaris was a proper candidate for the SEC’s first
deferred prosecution agreement because of the
company’s “immediate self-reporting, thorough
internal investigation, full cooperation with SEC
staff, enhanced anti-corruption procedures, and
enhanced training.”227

GUIDELINES
These Guidelines are intended to provide guidance regarding FCPA compliance and enforcement issues. They are not, however, a substitute
for professional representation in any specific
situation.
Briefing Papers © 2011 by Thomson Reuters

1. Companies should know that the Government interprets the FCPA’s provisions very
broadly, including the definition of “foreign
official.” Companies should be aware that lowlevel employees of state-owned companies may
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be considered foreign officials for purposes of
the FCPA.
2. Companies should be aware that the FCPA
prohibits corrupt payments, regardless of their
size. There is no exemption for de minimis payments under the FCPA.
3. Companies are advised to prohibit employees from making facilitating payments without
obtaining advanced, written approval from legal
counsel.
4. Companies should be aware that the Government may charge a company with violating the
books-and-records provisions of the FCPA, even in
the absence of a substantive antibribery charge.
If company legal counsel permits an employee to
make a facilitating payment, the company must
ensure that it is properly recorded in the company
books and records as a “facilitating payment.”
5. Companies should not pay for any “hospitality expenses” of a foreign official without
the advanced, written approval of legal counsel.
Expenses must have a legitimate business purpose and be directly related to the promotion or
demonstration of a product or the performance
of a Government contract.
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6. Government contractors should be aware
that a violation of the FCPA may result in the
company’s suspension or debarment from the
U.S. procurement system and, depending on the
extent of a contractor’s global presence, debarment under the EU regime as well. Contractors
are advised to negotiate coordinated settlement
agreements amongst all relevant agencies and
countries to prevent this collateral consequence.
7. Contractors should be familiar with the
antibribery laws of all of the countries in which
they do business and must tailor their antibribery compliance programs to comply with these
laws.
8. If a company discovers evidence of a potential violation of the FCPA, it must take action
immediately to verify the accuracy of the allegation. Companies should not prolong investigations, as employee-whistleblowers may disclose
allegations to the Government.
9. Any internal investigation into potential
FCPA violations should be conducted by experienced and independent outside counsel. Companies should not leave the internal investigation to
in-house counsel, who may lack the impartiality
necessary to fully investigate the company.
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